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3Foreword
In 2008 the Whitlam Institute mounted a five-part series of public information 
forums on Energy Security. That series brought together an exceptional group 
of speakers: scientists across several disciplines; industry leaders; analysts.* 
Quite unexpectedly the succession of presentations also alerted us to what we 
subsequently dubbed the ‘democratic challenges of climate change’.
Essentially, while the focus of attention was quite properly on the science, the 
environmental implications and the appropriate policy responses, it became 
apparent that there had been little explicit examination of the institutional 
processes and pressures that accompanied this most critical debate.
Since that time we have been exploring that theme through several occasional 
papers under our Perspectives series. In December 2010 we published 
Democratic Challenges in Tackling Climate Change [Perspectives no. 5]  
by the Hon Dr Barry Jones AO. This was followed by Climate Change in a 
New Democratic Age: why we need more, not less, democratic participation 
[Perspectives no. 9] by Dr Randal Stewart in December 2013.
The paper before you brings a further dimension to this discussion focusing as it 
does on the direct experience of government in a resource dependent economy. 
Dr Kevin Taft offers his account of the fraught interplay between ‘fossil fuels, 
global warming and democracy’ in his home province of Alberta, Canada. He 
writes as participant in and observer of a ‘collision’ between the climate change 
imperatives of cutting carbon emissions and the commercial imperatives being 
prosecuted by the fossil fuel industry.
Dr Taft is particularly well placed to do so. He brings to the table his experience  
of eleven years (2001-12) in the Alberta parliament including four years (2004-
08) as leader in opposition of the Alberta Liberal Party. He holds a PhD in 
Business from the University of Warwick, and has written four books addressing 
major political issues in Alberta centring on government in the provision of 
services and public accountability. 
Dr Taft spent several weeks with the Whitlam Institute earlier this year working 
on this paper, presenting his work in public and at private gatherings at which he 
proved himself willing to respond in detail and with a welcome openness to the 
questions and challenges put to him. As was evident to those he met and will be 
to readers of his paper, Dr Taft is an astute, though not dispassionate, observer 
and a rigorous analyst. His willingness to establish a firmly founded case then 
arguing for it in plain-speaking but measured terms is refreshing in a debate  
that too often gets lost in the rhetoric and sloganeering. 
Yet Dr Taft allows us no pretence that this is a cosy fireside chat, for the question 
at the heart of his argument is shocking in its implications: can democracy as we 
know it survive global warming?
No doubt readers will draw their own conclusions. Whatever those conclusions 
might be, the question is by no means an idle one and not one confined to 
Alberta alone.
Eric Sidoti
Director
Whitlam Institute within the University of Western Sydney
*  You can re-visit these presentations at:  
http://www.whitlam.org/the_program/archives/energy_security_the_real_story
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5I. Introduction
Democracy is caught in a collision between two forces: 
the need to respond to global warming by cutting carbon 
emissions, and the demands of the fossil fuel industry to 
increase carbon use and production. This is a slow motion 
collision that will take decades to conclude, though its 
ending seems inevitable: coal, and then oil and natural 
gas, will be replaced by more sustainable energy sources, 
but only after great damage to the environment. 
In this paper I explore the question, What happens to 
democracy when the fossil fuel industry collides with 
global warming?
This collision is already making its marks on democratic 
practices. The fossil fuel industry is using every tool it 
can to preserve its wealth and power by pressuring 
governments, political parties, universities, regulators, 
courts, and voters. It is a process of tough, aggressive, and 
sophisticated politics that ultimately depends on denying 
the evidence that global warming poses a danger that 
needs to be urgently confronted. 
Without a theoretical framework to focus this inquiry, it 
could easily produce little more than a list of anecdotes 
about politics and influence. The value of good theory is 
that it reveals the patterns in the evidence, showing how 
the disparate pieces are connected to one another, and 
to larger historical, social, and economic factors. In this 
paper, I drew theory from (among others) Valerie Bunce, 
Timothy Mitchell, and most importantly Terry Lynn Karl. 
I use the work of these scholars to focus on the Canadian 
province of Alberta. Alberta provides an example of what 
can happen to democracy in places where fossil fuel 
production predominates. From time-to-time I link the 
paper to Australia, which depends even more than Canada 
on mineral extraction, and which is on the burning edge 
of global warming.1
This paper should be read as a warning to people 
everywhere who are concerned about fossil fuel 
dependence, global warming, and democracy. Those who 
value democracy must ask, Can democracy as we know it 
survive global warming? 
1  I cordially thank Anna Yeatman and Eric Sidoti of the Whitlam 
Institute at the University of Western Sydney for encouraging me to 
write this paper, and for helping me to see that there are links in the 
issues it addresses between Canada and Australia. 
II. The Parameters
A. Democracy
The promise of democracy is that the people being 
governed are also the supreme authority. Collectively, 
citizens are their own sovereign; the governed are 
governing themselves.
Modern democracies are defined by several 
interdependent features:
• the rule of law, including the equality of all citizens 
before the law;
• open and fair elections, held regularly;
• guaranteed rights and freedoms, including those of 
thought and expression, assembly, voting, access to 
information, etc.;
• a non-partisan state, accountable to elected 
representatives and citizens, with a professional and 
rational civil service; and
• independent and effective institutions.
Through these features, democracy expresses itself as an 
unending contest among people with differing political, 
social, and economic priorities, within a set of rules that 
are generally accepted and understood by all participants. 
In the words of Valerie Bunce, a leading scholar on 
democracy, “…we need to think of democracy as a two-
part proposition, having uncertain results (or competition) 
but also having certain procedures. Indeed, it is precisely 
this combination of competition bounded by rules that 
makes democracy both responsive and effective...”.2 
Democratic procedures and democratic results develop 
together through the endless dynamic of governance, 
constantly shaping one another. A change in the 
procedures can tilt the competition and change the results.
The reality of democratic governance is much messier and 
more complex than this description indicates. But as a 
working understanding it is a useful basis of analysis.
2  Bunce, Valerie. “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded 
Generalizations.” Comparative Political Studies. August/Sept 2000, 
Vol. 33, p. 714.
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citizenry, there is no denying the importance of elites. 
Elites compete with one another within the procedures 
and institutions of democracy for influence, control, and 
the right to govern. The broad citizenry ultimately calls 
these elites to account through elections. Bunce and 
others have found that when there are divided elites 
with different and competing interests, “the probability 
of democratic outcomes increases substantially.”3 
On the other hand, when one elite with a singular 
interest becomes dominant, democracy suffers. The 
“interests, values, and actions” of elites are crucial to the 
strengthening or weakening of democracy, and “to its 
survival or collapse under conditions of crisis.”4
Global warming threatens to create the conditions of just 
such a crisis. 
B. Global Warming
The science of global warming unequivocally shows that 
human activity, especially the emission of CO2 from 
the burning of fossil fuels, is changing the atmosphere, 
causing it to trap more of the Sun’s heat. This heat, which 
is absorbed by the air, land, and oceans, is leading to 
global warming, causing the climate to change.5 Global 
warming is already widely evident, and will increase with 
time. Droughts, floods, and extreme weather will be more 
frequent; rising ocean levels will endanger coastal cities; 
and food production will be disrupted. There will be mass 
extinctions of animals and plants (already well underway),6 
and immense stresses on human civilization.7 
The theory and evidence of global warming are now 
so compelling and well known that one would expect 
democratic governments to be responding with effective 
actions to drastically reduce CO2 emissions. Some 
countries, particularly in Europe, are leading the way. They 
are investing heavily in energy efficiency and alternate 
energy sources, and emissions have modestly declined. 
Other countries are lagging. Canada and Australia are 
two of the world’s worst performers. Per capita emissions 
of CO2 in these countries are double those in Germany, 
France, and Britain, and that gap has been growing. 
Canada’s total CO2 emissions grew 17% from 1990 to 
2010, and Australia’s per capita emissions are even higher 
than Canada’s. 8,9
3 Bunce, p. 707.
4 Bunce, p. 715.
5  http://www.wmo.int/pages/themes/climate/causes_of_climate_
change.php
6  See for example Elizabeth Kolbert’s book The Sixth Extinction.  
(2014) New York: Henry Holt and Company. 
7  “Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptations, and Vulnerability: 
Summary for Policymakers.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change.
8  http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/details/environment/
greenhouse-gas-emissions.aspx
9  http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/ 
1370.0~2010~Chapter~International%20comparisons%20(6.5.6)
Canadians and Australians have the same information that 
people elsewhere have, and similar technical and social 
capacities. Yet their governments are failing to take serious 
actions. If democracy is “responsive and effective” (to use 
the words of Bunce) then in Canada and Australia, what is 
wrong with democracy? 
Or, to get at the issue differently, in Canada and Australia, 
who is democracy being responsive and effective for? If 
it’s not for the broad citizenry, then is it still democracy?
C.  The Fossil Fuel  
Industry’s Predicament
Australia is among the largest exporters of coal and liquid 
natural gas (LNG) in the world, and Canada sells more 
oil and gas to the USA than does Saudi Arabia or anyone 
else. In Canada, oil production is rising rapidly through 
the development of the Athabasca oilsands in northern 
Alberta. In Australia, the already huge coal mining and 
LNG industries continue to grow.10,11 Both countries have 
large and sophisticated domestic fossil fuel corporations, 
and host major international ones. The prosperity of these 
corporations helped both countries steer through the 
2008 global financial crisis and the resulting recession 
better than most other countries.
The long-term future for the fossil fuel industry, however, 
is threatened. Aggressive action to reduce CO2 emissions 
means that entire societies need to replace fossil fuels 
with other sources of energy. This menaces the growth, 
profitability, and value of the fossil fuel industry, and in the 
long term puts its very existence in doubt. 
This vulnerability is made clear in a report titled 
“Unburnable Carbon,” produced by a financial research 
group called Carbon Tracker.12 Their research compares 
the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb extra CO2, to 
the amount of CO2 that will be released if the proven 
reserves13 of coal, oil, and gas of the world’s major public, 
private, and state-owned fossil fuel corporations are 
actually used. The outcome is ominous. The atmosphere’s 
capacity to absorb extra CO2 by 2050 without heating 
more than 2ºC is 565 gigatonnes.14 More than that and 
the risk of runaway global warming becomes very high. 
Unfortunately, this is a small fraction of the amount 
of CO2 that will be released if all the proven fossil fuel 
reserves listed as assets by these corporations are used. 
That number is 2,795 gigatonnes, or five times the amount 
the atmosphere can absorb without runaway warming.
10  World Coal Association, Coal Facts 2013.
11  World LNG Report – 2013. International Gas Union. Available at 
http://www.igu.org/gas-knowhow/publications/igu-publications/
IGU_world_LNG_report_2013.pdf
12  Unburnable Carbon – Are the world’s financial markets carrying  
a carbon bubble? Carbon Tracker Initiative. 2011. Available at  
http://www.carbontracker.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/ 
2011/07/Unburnable-Carbon-Full-rev2.pdf
13  Proven reserves are reserves that are at least 90% likely to be 
extracted; probable reserves are at least 50% likely to be extracted; 
and possible reserves are at least 10% likely to be extracted. 
14  This number is derived from work by the Potsdam Institute, one of 
Europe’s top climate change research centres. A gigatonne is one 
billion tonnes.
7In effect, then, serious action on global warming will 
mean that about 80% of the coal, oil, and gas held as 
proven reserves by the world’s fossil fuel industry must 
be left in the ground as stranded assets. These stranded 
assets represent a large portion of the value of the 
industry; Carbon Tracker suggests more than half.15 
It gets worse. Using information from the International 
Energy Agency, the report calculates that at the current 
rate of emissions, the atmosphere’s 565 gigatonne 
capacity to absorb CO2 without triggering runaway 
warming will be used up by the year 2027. After that, the 
planet moves into a much higher level of risk. The forces 
are accelerating in the collision between the fossil fuel 
industry and global warming.
The consequences of this for financial markets and 
governments are only beginning to be considered. Fossil 
fuel companies are among the largest on the planet, 
and include many of the top Canadian and Australian 
businesses. The report states that the long-term viability 
of these businesses rests on their future ability to extract 
and sell carbon, yet that ability cannot be fulfilled without 
causing catastrophic global warming. The conclusion of 
this report is that these companies are badly overvalued 
for the long run, representing a ‘carbon bubble’ that 
investors, regulators, and governments are not yet 
prepared to handle. 
The report is silent on another implication: that the fossil 
fuel industry and its allies will fight furiously to be able to 
sell their coal, oil, and gas, regardless of global warming. 
Global warming endangers the fossil fuel industry as  
much as it endangers polar bears and coral reefs. But 
unlike polar bears and coral reefs, the fossil fuel industry  
is defending its interests.
15  The paper by Carbon Tracker (p. 19) quotes research by McKinsey 
that “greater than 50% of the value of an oil and gas company 
resides in the value of cash flows to be generated in year 11 
onwards,” illustrating the importance of large reserves to the value 
of these companies. If these reserves cannot be used the value of 
the companies may be imperilled.
III.  Petrostates and  
Carbon Democracy
A. Mineral Economies
Canada and Australia depend for their prosperity on 
mineral production much more than other wealthy 
countries. For Canada, the value of all resource production 
is 10% of GDP; for Australia, 12%. This is double the 
proportion in the US, and triple or more the proportions  
in Japan, Germany, France, and Britain.16
Minerals accounted for 30% of Canada’s merchandise 
exports in 2011. (Oil and gas were 20%, other minerals 
were 10%.)17 The figure is even higher for Australia, 
where 67% of merchandise exports were related to 
mining in 2012, including 27% from coal, oil, and gas.18
As high as these proportions are, they get far higher in 
individual provinces and states. In Alberta, petroleum 
production accounts for over 30% of GDP, and over 70% 
of merchandise exports.19 Royalties from petroleum are 
“…by far the largest component of government revenues  
in Alberta,” accounting for an average of just over  
30% from 1987 to 2007.20 In 2012 in Western Australia, 
the resource industry (mostly iron ore production) 
accounted for 35% of GDP, 87% of merchandise exports, 
and paid over $5 billion in royalties.21 In the Northern 
Territory resources account for over 20% of GDP, led by 
natural gas.22
Mineral production in Alberta, Western Australia, and  
the Northern Territory is ten and in some cases twenty 
times the portion of the economy compared to Europe, 
Japan, and the US. This is bound to have an effect on  
their politics and democracy.
16  Murray, J.D. “Is There a Commodity Curse?”, in Ryan, David, 
ed. (2013). Boom and Bust Again. University of Alberta Press, 
Edmonton.
17  Moeller, Dylan. “Canada’s Trade Performance.” CRD Working 
Paper, Export Development Canada. August 1, 2012. 
18  “Merchandise Exports,” Cat. No. 5368.0. Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, May, 2013.
19  Tremblay, Pascal. “Alberta’s Merchandise Trade with the World.” 
Library of Parliament Research Publications, Ottawa. 2013. 
Sourced on May 6, 2014, at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/
ResearchPublications/2013-32-e.htm.
20  Landon, Stuart, and Constance Smith, “Government Revenue 
Volatility in Alberta” in Ryan, David, ed. (2013). Boom and Bust 
Again. University of Alberta Press, Edmonton. The calculation of 
this percent excludes the value of federal government transfers to 
the Alberta government.
21  “Western Australia’s Resource Industry Fact Sheet,” Government of 
Western Australia Department of Mines and Petroleum. www.dmp.
wa.gov.au/documents/132431_Resource_Industry_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
22  “Mining Industry Economic Contribution,” Year Book Australia 
2012, Australian Bureau of Statistics (24/05/2012).
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Economists and scholars have long realized that mineral 
economies engender particular political patterns.23  
In most of the world, minerals in the ground are owned 
by the state until they are mined or extracted. This stems 
from ancient laws under which all land was owned by 
the sovereign. Miners paid a fee to the sovereign called 
a ‘royalty’ in return for extracting the minerals, as they 
generally still do. 
Because the state owns the raw minerals, it plays a double 
role in mineral development. In its first role, the state 
establishes the laws and context for labour, environment, 
contracts, infrastructure, and so on, and collects taxes. 
The state is like a referee who collects a fee for setting  
and enforcing the rules of the game, as it does for all 
other economic activities. 
With mineral development the state also plays a second 
role, as a direct participant that owns the crucial input  
(the mineral) and determines the conditions and price  
of sale to others. With mineral development the state  
is a player as well as a referee. 
In jurisdictions where mineral production is relatively small, 
the effects on democracy of this double role may not 
be important. But in places that rely heavily on mineral 
production it can create hazards for democracy, because 
the distinctions between economic and political interests 
for governments and mineral developers can dissolve.  
As Terry Lynn Karl writes, in these jurisdictions “…
economic rationality cannot be easily separated from 
political rationality.”24
The state becomes a primary target for resource 
businesses to influence and try to control. A compliant 
state can mean both easy rules of development 
and low royalties. The return on investment from 
influencing governments can be far better than the 
return on investment from new equipment, research, or 
development. The cost of one large mining truck is far 
more than the cost of a comprehensive political lobbying 
and public relations campaign to, for example, reduce 
royalties.25 (This applies whether the corporations are 
private or state-owned.)
23  For an early example see Nankani, Gobind (August, 1979) 
“Development Problems of Mineral Countries” written for  
the World Bank.
24  Karl, Terry Lynn. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petrostates. 
(1997) Berkeley: University of California Press, p.15.
25  A Caterpillar model 797B mining dump truck costs $5 million; 
Syncrude operates a fleet of 90 of these at its oilsands mine near 
Ft. McMurray, Alberta.
The incentives go the other direction too, from politicians 
to corporations, tempting political leaders to cater to 
mineral interests over the interests of the broader state, 
in return for political and even personal benefits. For 
governments with mineral economies, royalties can 
become a politically addictive way to cut taxes and 
subsidize services. As a result, politicians can become 
more devoted to mineral exploitation than to social and 
economic development or environmental protection. 
Mineral exploitation can trump all other priorities.26
This distorting political-economic dynamic of mineral 
wealth can be seen in the demise of Imperial Spain  
(gold and silver) in the 18th century, the struggles in  
the 20th century of Chile and Peru (copper, nitrates, 
guano), and more recently in the problems confronted  
by several ‘petrostates.’27
C. The Theory of Petrostates
The relation between fossil fuels and democracy has 
spawned an important body of literature. In the decades 
of rapid economic growth following World War Two, 
immense wealth flowed to petroleum producing countries 
outside the industrialized West, including Venezuela, 
Mexico, Indonesia, several countries in the Middle East, 
and eventually Nigeria and other African countries. 
Economists and others expected this wealth to spur 
democracy and industrial prosperity. Instead, many of 
these countries struggled with political oppression, war, 
corruption, gross inequalities, and weak civil society. By 
the 1980s, scholars were asking why petroleum wealth 
often led countries into misfortune. The puzzle was made 
more intriguing because many underdeveloped countries 
that did not have petroleum flourished (eg. South Korea, 
Taiwan, Turkey).
Terry Lynn Karl’s 1997 book Paradox of Plenty became 
a benchmark in this field, and legitimized ‘petrostate’ 
as a scholarly term. Through careful historic, economic, 
and political analysis she found that “dependence on 
a particular export commodity shapes not only social 
classes and regime types… but also the very institutions 
of the state, the framework for decision-making, and 
the decision calculus of policy-makers.”28 In other words, 
“The manner in which a state earns its living influences 
its own patterns of institutionalization.” If a state earns 
a disproportionate amount of its revenue from minerals, 
then the policy environment of officials; the goals of 
the state; the types of public institutions; and the locus 
of authority are all altered. In the particular case of 
petrostates, “oil-provoked changes in state capacity are 
the intervening variable…” regardless of geography, 
religion, culture, or history. 29
26 Karl, Chapter 1, pp. 3-22.
27 Karl, Chapter 10, pp. 222-242.
28 Karl, p. 7.
29 Karl, p. 44, italics in original.
9This effect, said Karl, explains why countries as diverse 
as Venezuela, Nigeria, and Iran ended up with similar 
anti-democratic politico-economic profiles: they were 
configured by their reliance on petroleum. 
What about the exceptions? Why didn’t Norway  
become a petrostate? 
Karl’s work provides an explanation. Countries that 
became petrostates did not have well-developed state 
organizations, social capacities, or even national identities 
when their petroleum booms began. When the first oil 
boom hit Venezuela, for example, it had no modern 
police, court or education systems; no modern civil service 
or regulators; no modern royalty or tax systems; and very 
little physical infrastructure. Petroleum companies needed 
these, so of necessity they and their home governments 
helped develop them, in Venezuela and many other 
countries, working with whichever locals were most 
sympathetic or powerful, and against those who were not. 
Time and again traditional societies were overwhelmed 
by the demands of the petroleum business and its allies, 
the floods of money, and the pressures of international 
markets and politics. The origins and character of these 
states became entangled with and defined by the 
production of petroleum and the fights over its spoils. 
Democracy, state-building, and good government were 
secondary priorities.
In contrast, when North Sea oil was discovered in the 
1960s, Norway was a cohesive and deeply entrenched 
state that had the government, political parties, public 
service, courts, tax systems, universities, and other 
features needed to successfully manage the petroleum 
companies and the surge of wealth. Even then, it was  
a nearly overwhelming challenge.
“If there is one clear lesson from the experience of oil 
exporters,” writes Karl, “it is that developmental outcomes 
depend on the character of state institutions.”30 This same 
lesson, she makes clear, applies to any state that becomes 
overly dependent for its prosperity on mineral extraction.
D. Carbon Democracy
Petrostates are fascinating and dangerous. They fuel 
violence and provoke wars, and they disrupt global trade 
and politics. Making sense of them is strategically valuable 
for other countries, academics, and corporations. 
It took longer to realize there is a reverse issue to be 
explored. If fossil fuels have the capacity to unmake 
societies, perhaps they also have the capacity to make 
societies. Are wealthy, stable and democratic countries 
in some sense produced by fossil fuels? Maybe these 
countries aren’t just fuelled by coal, oil, and gas, they  
are fashioned by them.
30 Karl, p. 239.
Fifteen years after Karl published The Paradox of Plenty, 
Timothy Mitchell published Carbon Democracy, opening 
new perspectives on the relation of democracy with 
fossil fuels. While Karl focused on the ways in which 
petroleum wealth often confounded democratization 
and development, Mitchell looked at the ways in which 
coal and then oil shaped modern democracy’s particular 
form. “Fossil fuels,” he wrote, “helped create both the 
possibility of modern democracy and its limits.”31 
Mitchell’s analysis begins with coal, the fuel that made 
possible the Industrial Revolution. Coal mining and 
transportation created concentrated workplaces and 
narrow supply lines that could be easily disrupted by 
workers. As coal became the essential fuel of industrial 
society it created conditions that empowered organized 
labour. A strike by coal miners, or by the railway workers 
who carried coal to factories and cities, could disrupt 
the economy of a whole nation in ways that seem 
unimaginable today. Starting in the 1870s workers in 
Britain, Germany, and elsewhere used strikes and other 
tactics to demand better working conditions and a 
more democratic society. They gained power that was 
unprecedented for workers, laying foundations for 20th 
century democracy. The last gasp of this power was the 
bitter showdown between the government of Margaret 
Thatcher and the British coal miners in 1984-85.
Oil, which came into wider use during and following 
World War One, had a different effect. It required less 
labour to produce and transport, and once discovered it 
was available in great abundance, seemingly without limit. 
Through much of the 20th century there was so much oil 
available that the biggest problem for producers was to 
limit supply in order to prop up the price. This is the most 
vital function of the OPEC cartel.
Mitchell argues that the transition from coal to oil 
concentrated power in fewer hands, gradually weakened 
organized labour, and changed the nature of democracy. 
At the end of World War Two the US produced two-thirds 
of the world’s oil, contributing to America’s immense 
power. Drawing on extensive research he argues that 
the US, through its reconstruction of Europe and other 
policies, reorganized much of the world’s energy system 
to run on oil, priced and paid for in US dollars. This 
weakened the powerful communist-leaning coal mining 
unions in Europe; established the US dollar as the pre-
eminent currency of international trade; extended US 
influence; and enriched the petroleum industry, largely 
headquartered in the US and Britain.
31 Mitchell, Timothy. Carbon Democracy. (2011) London: Verso, p.1.
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Oil helped usher in a surge of industrial and consumer 
prosperity in the second half of the 20th century, providing 
the model of a consumer society that in various forms is 
now emulated worldwide. One sign of this is the soaring 
consumption of oil. It took from 1860 to the late 1980s – 
130 years – for humanity to consume its first trillion barrels 
of oil, while it took only 22 years more to consume the 
second trillion barrels of oil.32
This could not last. Mitchell, writing fifteen years after 
Karl, foresees something Karl did not: “We are entering 
the declining decades of the fossil-fuel era…Fossil fuels 
are not about to run out, but two predicaments make the 
world they engineered unexpectedly fragile.”33 The first 
predicament: the decline of inexpensive sources of fossil 
fuels. The second, more intractable one: the advent of 
global warming as a result of their use.
Fossil fuels made possible the world of this era, including 
its particular forms of corporatized democracy, as 
well as its economic growth, cities, consumer lifestyle, 
communications, travel, politics, food production, wars, 
empires, and environmental impacts. The decline of their 
use will change all of these.
E. Putting the Theory to Use
Timothy Mitchell’s work makes clear that fossil fuels  
shape modern democracies as much as they shape 
petrostates. Terry Lynn Karl’s analysis makes clear that it 
is state institutions that bear the brunt of pressure in this 
shaping process. If state institutions are weak and fail, the 
result is Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria, or gold-addicted Spain  
of the 17th century. If they are strong and succeed, the 
result can be Norway. 
This emphasis on institutions leads back to the definition 
of democracy presented early in this paper. Independent 
and effective state institutions are bulwarks of democracy. 
They alone are not sufficient to sustain it, but they 
are necessary for it to survive and flourish. The rule of 
law requires institutions such as parliaments, courts, 
and police. Open and fair elections require institutions 
such as electoral agencies, media, and political parties. 
Guaranteed rights and freedoms require institutions such 
as courts and human rights commissions. The education, 
science, intellectual development, and cultural life of a 
country require institutions.
In its turn, global warming requires that state institutions 
take action if there is to be an effective response. 
Individuals acting alone can have a symbolic effect, but 
little else. They can’t even save themselves, for global 
warming obeys no boundaries. The burning of Australian 
coal will contribute to heat waves and droughts there, 
whether that coal is burned in New South Wales or 
exported to China.34
32 Mitchell, p. 260.
33 Mitchell, p. 231.
34  For a discussion of the risks of specific impacts of human-induced 
climate change, see “Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability Summary for Policymakers.” Intergovernmental 
The state, through its institutions, is the only organization 
with the capacity to impose limits on emissions; to 
demand higher standards for fuel economy and building 
codes; to tax carbon to reflect its full environmental cost; 
to impose penalties, rewards, incentives, permissions, 
restrictions, and enforcement. 
Inevitably then, state institutions must be wielded to 
challenge the fossil fuel industry. The fossil fuel industry will 
push back, hard. This contest will largely be fought among 
elites of business, politics, government, and science. 
In jurisdictions where there are many different elites 
competing in a setting of independent institutions, 
democracy will be raucous and vital, and there is a 
reasonable chance of responsive and effective results  
to curtail carbon emissions. But in jurisdictions where  
the interest, values, and actions of one elite gain  
pre-eminence, democracy may be in jeopardy. 
The hazard that global warming brings to democracy is 
that the institutions of democracy will be remade in order 
to protect the interests of the fossil fuel industry, creating 
a politics that privileges fossil fuel interests and fails to 
respond effectively to the democratic aspirations and 
long-term interests of the broad population.
Panel on Climate Change, WGII AR5, March 31, 2014.
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IV. The Experience of Alberta 
A. Alberta as a Petroleum Economy
Canada’s oil and natural gas production is concentrated 
in the province of Alberta. Alberta’s petroleum industry 
developed through a series of expanding steps that 
began in 1883 with a tiny project by the Canadian Pacific 
Railroad to exploit natural gas in southeastern Alberta; 
then an oil boom in 1914 at Turner Valley near Calgary; 
then the much larger oil booms of central and northern 
Alberta after 1947; then a surge in natural gas production 
in the 1990s; and now the largest of all, the development 
of the Athabasca Oilsands.
The Athabasca Oilsands are the third largest oil reserves on 
Earth, and are one of the few reserves in the world where 
production is rapidly and reliably increasing.35,36 Because of 
the oilsands the Alberta government, with just 4.1 million 
citizens (equivalent to one medium-large city in most of 
the world), owns more oil than Russia, Iran, Nigeria, or the 
US, and is developing it quickly.37 From 2001 to 2012, $160 
billion were invested in the oil sands, and a further $207 
billion is expected from 2013 to 2022.38 
With a century-long history and the opportunity to 
develop one of the planet’s great carbon reserves, the 
petroleum industry has a lot of influence in Alberta. 
An impressive portion of the industry is headquartered 
there, and it is active in major oil and gas fields around 
the world.39 It may be Canada’s most successful industry, 
forming a fully integrated sector from advanced research, 
software development, geo-engineering, equipment 
design and manufacturing, financing, production, 
upgrading, refining, transportation, and marketing. 
Different individuals and groups within the industry have 
differing priorities, attitudes, and politics. But this is a 
diversity united by a common commitment to fossil fuels. 
The fulfilment of its purpose is to find, produce, and sell 
oil and natural gas, bringing it into direct conflict with the 
need to slow global warming.
B.  The Petrolization of Democracy  
in Alberta
With its lopsided economy, Alberta is deep into the risk 
territory of becoming a petrostate, a risk that has been 
offset by its democratic institutions, among other things. 
To help her identify petrostates, Karl used the World 
Bank’s threshold of mineral economies, in which mineral 
production accounted for at least 10% of GDP and 40% 
of total merchandise exports. 40 Alberta soars far beyond 
these markers.
35 US Energy Information Administration website: http://www.eia.gov
36 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers website: www.capp.ca
37  Under Canada’s Constitution Act, provincial governments own 
most natural resources; Alberta has had this right since 1930.
38  Government of Alberta “Alberta’s Oilsands,” April, 2014, at http://
oilsands.alberta.ca/economicinvestment.html
39  In 2012, Calgary Economic Development listed 111 oil and gas 
companies headquartered in Calgary with annual revenues of $100 
million or more, including dozens with revenues in excess of $1 
billion. Calgary Herald, May 8, 2012, “Calgary a Head Office Hub.”
40 Karl, p.17.
This economy puts a lot of pressure on democratic 
institutions in Alberta, a pressure that is intensifying as 
oilsands development swells.
Karl warns that the stresses, demands, and financial stakes 
of petroleum development can be so vast that they have 
a “direct impact on the decisional framework” of a state, 
meaning that the state can end up forming itself to the 
requirements and interests of petroleum development. 
“Indeed,” says Karl, “the institutional molding brought 
about by dependence on petrodollars [can be] 
overwhelming in oil-exporting countries.”41 The notion of 
‘institutional molding’ points to the treacherous territory 
that state institutions must navigate when confronted with 
developing immense petroleum wealth.
In Alberta, the influence of the petroleum industry has 
intensified since 2008, coinciding with the enormous 
surge in oilsands investment. The scale and nature of this 
influence can be seen in Alberta’s political parties and the 
legislature; the major industry regulator; the civil service; 
the universities; and the courts. The changes in these 
institutions reveal that democracy itself is being bent in 
new and unhealthy directions, and arguably a different 
kind of state is taking shape in Alberta. 
There is no reason to assume that the same fate isn’t  
a strong possibility for other democracies in which  
fossil fuel production is economically crucial.
B.i. Political Parties and the Legislature
During Alberta’s 2008 general election, all major parties 
called for royalty increases and stricter environmental 
controls, which had broad public support. For the first 
time in many years, petroleum industry leaders felt 
alienated from Alberta’s politics. After the election a 
group in the industry formed an organization to build 
a political party in which the interests of the petroleum 
industry would be paramount. The group was called 
“Protect the Patch,” referring to the ‘oilpatch,’ and the 
political party was called the Wildrose Party, named after 
Alberta’s provincial flower. Until that time, this party had 
been on the political margins.
An early indicator of the direction Protect the Patch  
would take is found in a letter dated April, 2009, raising 
funds and support for the Wildrose Party. Seven names 
are listed at the bottom of the letter, including David 
Yager, a prominent industry figure who would eventually 
become President of the Wildrose. The letter, directed  
to “members of Alberta’s oil and gas industry,” is clear: 
“…the ultimate success of our industry is now political. 
Only when the government of Alberta supports and  
trusts its most important industry – oil and gas – will 
Alberta’s future be truly secure.” The letter sketches out 
a plan to help the Wildrose form a government, and 
concludes by saying, “Our oil and gas industry must 
continue to lead the way. Please help us to help Alberta  
to a new political future.” 
41 Karl, pp.15,16.
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Members of Protect the Patch were among the biggest 
fundraisers for the Wildrose Party, shaped many of its 
policies, provided organizational capacity, sat on the party 
executive, and provided thirteen candidates for it in the 
following election, which was in 2012. In that election, 
Wildrose became the Official Opposition and a serious 
rival to form the next government of Alberta. 
During this same period other industry groups maintained 
intense pressure on the Progressive Conservative (PC) 
party, which has governed Alberta continuously since 
1971. Men and women with the PC party frequently move 
between industry positions and government positions, 
including premiers, deputy premiers, energy ministers,  
and treasurers. The petroleum industry has provided 
massive financial donations to the PCs since the PCs  
first came to office in 1971.42 
This relationship was briefly strained under the tenure 
of Ed Stelmach as Premier, from 2006 to 2011. Under 
Stelmach, the PC government introduced a $15/tonne 
levy on CO2 emissions by major emitters and tried to raise 
royalties. The proposed royalty increases so enraged the 
industry that Stelmach was driven to resign in 2011 by a 
campaign of constant subversion, largely from within his 
own party. His successor as Premier ensured the PC party 
and government returned to being loyal champions of  
the industry. 
The outcome of this period of political dynamics is that  
the petroleum industry has dominating influence with 
both the governing PCs and the opposition Wildrose. No 
matter which wins an election the resulting government 
will be a close ally of the industry.
B.ii. Regulators
One of the key roles of government in a modern 
democracy is to establish regulatory institutions that 
protect the public interest. The Alberta government 
established its first energy regulator in 1938 after years 
of vehement resistance from petroleum producers that 
included advertising and political campaigns and a legal 
challenge in the Supreme Court of Canada. 43 The fight 
helped bring down the government in 1935 – publicly 
derided as ‘Bolshevist’ by a leading oil and gas producer 
– and illustrated the first stages of “institutional molding” 
(using Karl’s term) which pressure from petroleum 
producers can introduce. The regulator, then known as the 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation Board, decade-
by-decade built itself a highly respected reputation for its 
competence and its quasi-judicial independence. 
42  Five petroleum companies alone contributed more than  
$500,000 in toto to the PC party from 2004-2010. See  
http://www.edmontonjournal.com/news/donations/top_donors.html.
43  For an excellent account of this see chapters two and three of 
David H. Breen’s major book Alberta’s Petroleum Industry and the 
Conservation Board, University of Alberta Press, Edmonton, 1993.
In 2012, the Alberta government passed legislation 
drastically changing the regulatory processes for the 
petroleum industry, replacing the established regulator 
with a new agency called the Alberta Energy Regulator. 
Among the biggest changes, it removed from legislation 
references to protecting the public interest, and it 
weakened the quasi-judicial arms-length nature of the 
regulator, making it more vulnerable to direct influence 
by the Minister of Energy. In addition, the entire cost 
of running the new regulator was turned over to the 
industry, and the person named as its chairman was a 
former head of the industry’s largest lobby group. 44 Then, 
in a move justified by government as improving efficiency, 
150 environmental officers were transferred from the 
government to the new energy regulator.45
The end result is that the primary regulator of the 
petroleum industry in Alberta has less responsibility 
to protect the public interest; is completely funded by 
industry; is chaired by a strong industry ally; and has been 
handed a large number of the government’s staff for 
environmental protection.
B.iii. The Public Service
In her analysis of petrostates, Karl finds that the role of 
the civil service is of utmost importance. Norway avoided 
becoming a petrostate in large part because it had a 
strong civil service that could stand apart from the power 
of the petroleum industry and protect the public interest. 
Corruption was non-existent and “…strong norms made 
arbitrary intervention by political leaders or organized 
interests illegitimate.” There were “….strong mechanisms 
of accountability, including ombudspeople, special courts, 
and public access to documents.” Norway’s civil service 
“…was the complete antithesis of Venezuela and the other 
politicized states” that fell into petrostate status.46
Alberta, like all of Canada, has a tradition of an 
independent, professional civil service, but there are signs 
that its independence is compromised. Officials circulate 
among positions in the public service, the regulators, 
and the petroleum industry. Industry staff sometimes 
get seconded to key roles in the public service. The lines 
separating these agencies lose meaning. 
44 Prince, J.P. “Requiem for a Regulator,” (2013) Unpublished paper.
45  Pratt, Sheila, “Staff flock to industry-paid watchdog.” Edmonton 
Journal, p. A3, December 23, 2013.
46 Karl, p. 217.
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Problems with the public service get exposed in 
unexpected ways. A court case in 2013 involved the 
Alberta Department of the Environment, which was 
responsible for administering and enforcing Alberta’s 
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, and 
its Water Act. The department had denied two groups 
their right to intervene in an application by an oilsands 
company to increase its production. The groups took the 
department to court.
The court’s decision was a sharp rebuke of the 
department. Quoting at length from internal government 
briefing notes that came up in the trial, the court found 
that the department had denied these groups their right 
to intervene not on the basis of law, but because the 
groups were known critics of oilsands development. The 
court concluded that the Department of Environment had 
violated the very legislation it was meant to uphold, and 
had “breached the principles of natural justice.” Evidence 
presented in this case suggests that this was not the only 
time this sort of breach occurred. This clearly appears to 
be about officials in the Alberta public service ignoring the 
rule of law to benefit petroleum development.47,48
The internal Department of Environment briefing notes 
that were important evidence in the judge’s ruling against 
the government had been written as information for the 
Department’s senior official (the deputy minister) in 2009. 
In 2013, this same official went on to become the CEO 
of the new Alberta Energy Regulator described earlier, 
reporting to a chairman who is, as noted earlier, a former 
head of the industry’s most powerful interest group.
B.iv. Universities
Another vital institution to modern democracy is the 
university. Universities provide education as well as 
scientific and intellectual capacity for societies, in a 
setting that is to be free and independent. As with other 
institutions in Alberta the question must be asked, Are 
the interests of Alberta’s universities increasingly being 
aligned with the interests of the petroleum industry? This 
can happen in various ways. The University of Alberta 
in Edmonton, one of the largest in Canada, boasts that 
“More than 1,000 U of A researchers collaborate on 
the oilsands and it environmental impact…”.49 For the 
university this is a success story, and valuable research is 
being done for oilsands corporations on reducing water 
use, detoxifying tailings ponds, reclaiming land, and so on. 
But there is a risk that research and funding on this scale 
turns the university into a client of the petroleum industry. 
Universities are not immune to pressure. 50
47  “Pembina Institute v Alberta (Environment and Sustainable 
Resources Development), 2013 ABQB 567, October, 2013.
48  Thomson, Graham. “Environmental ruling likely to sour European 
trip defending oilsands,” Edmonton Journal, October 3, 2013.
49 Source: http://why.ualberta.ca/ualbertafacts/Research
50  See, for example, Taft, Kevin, Democracy Derailed, Red Deer Press, 
Calgary. (2007) pp. 17-20.
A number of controversies at the University of Calgary 
reinforce this concern. A faculty member was caught 
unethically channeling about two hundred thousand 
dollars from petroleum companies and global warming 
deniers through a series of secretive accounts, to set up 
a trust fund at the university intended for use to oppose 
action on global warming. The university was forced to 
take corrective action.51,52 In another case, allegations 
were made that a researcher at a university institute was 
dismissed at the request of a pipeline company.53 The 
allegations were denied.
A different example involves the School of Public Policy at 
the University of Calgary, set up after the 2008 election. 
It was given a $1 million founding donation from Imperial 
Oil, and the position of chair of the school was endowed 
by one of Alberta’s senior oil executives. 
The person who heads up the School of Public Policy is 
an economist and tax analyst who publishes papers under 
the University of Calgary banner, and frequently appears 
in the media. In addition to heading “Canada’s Flagship 
School of Public Policy” (as it bills itself on its website), he 
is also on the board of Imperial Oil, which he discloses in 
his academic publications and on the Institute’s website. 
Imperial Oil’s 2012 Annual Report says he is paid almost 
$200,000 per year to serve on their board, and has 
accumulated $1 million worth of Imperial Oil shares. Like 
all their board members, he is obligated to advance the 
interests of Imperial Oil. Given the legal obligations on 
members of the board of Imperial Oil to serve its corporate 
interests, what does this indicate about the independence 
of the university and the work published under its name? 
B.v. The Courts
An independent court system is a cornerstone of 
democracy. In Canada, great care is usually taken  
by the provincial committees that review applicants  
and recommend their appointments as judges to  
ministers of justice. In Alberta the system is unusual. 
Provincial judges are appointed after being approved 
by two different committees. The first committee, as is 
standard, is comprised of people who occupy top judicial 
and legal positions in the province, such as the heads  
of the two law schools, the Chief Justice, and the head  
of the Law Society.
51 http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Friends_of_Science
52  http://www.canada.com/victoriatimescolonist/news/story.
html?id=3c955256-f327-465a-8135-778088f6131a
53  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/scientist-calls-u-of-c-
energy-centre-a-failure-1.1337139
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The second committee, unusual to Alberta, has eight of its 
eleven members handpicked by the Justice Minister, and 
this committee makes the final recommendation to the 
Minister on who should be appointed as judges. Among 
its members who have overt political ties is its chairman, 
who was the official agent for the Premier in the 2012 
election.54 His fields of law are oil and gas transactions, 
regulatory matters, and royalty issues. Remember, the 
nominees approved by his committee become the 
judges who will eventually hear cases on land claims, 
environmental violations, labour cases, and so on. Where 
will those judges stand? Why does Alberta need this 
second committee?
C. Institutional Molding
The examples illustrate how Alberta’s democratic 
institutions are being molded to privilege the interests of 
petroleum production over other interests. Such examples 
do not need to spring from a singular premeditated 
conspiracy. Rather, they are symptoms of an underlying 
condition that Karl describes as the thick network that 
coalesces between the state and petroleum producers  
in petrostates. 55
When a dominant industry with singular interests 
feels threatened, or just wants more, it can organize a 
campaign and sustain a mindset that, once mobilized, 
sweeps up far more than anyone initially expected. In 
these situations actions, once launched, need not be 
consciously coordinated by a conspirator; they can happen 
in concert because the interest and mindset are widely 
accepted. The injury to democracy is collateral damage 
from the main campaign to exploit the fossil fuel. 
This institutional molding narrows the democratic base of 
these institutions and aligns them in a manner that makes 
the logic of petroleum production pre-eminent. The 
petrolization of state and political institutions supplants 
their democratic purposes. 
One result is an enormous transfer of public wealth 
into private hands. Despite its immense oil and gas 
wealth; despite rates of corporate profit that are double 
those elsewhere in North America; despite its booming 
economy, the Alberta government’s spending on public 
services is similar to other Canadian provinces, it is 
taking on debt, and its relatively small Heritage Fund 
has stagnated since the early 1990s. Alberta’s royalty 
system is designed by the government for the benefit of 
the petroleum industry, 56 and those benefits will not be 
impaired, even if the alternative is to cut public services 
and increase government debt.
A second result of petrolization is that greenhouse gas 
emissions are being allowed to rise rapidly. Serious efforts 
at reducing them are often ignored or resisted by state 
institutions, government, and industry.
54  Russell, Jennie. “Appointment of judges politically biased in 
Alberta, critics say.” CBC News, July 25, 2013.
55 Karl, p. 240.
56  For illustrations of these points see Taft, Kevin, et al, Follow the 
Money (2012). Calgary: Detselig Enterprises.
The enormity of oilsands development means that 
petrostate tendencies are spreading from Alberta to 
Canada’s federal scene. Crude and refined petroleum 
products are now Canada’s largest exports.57 Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, whose riding is in Calgary, wants 
to expand this further. A top priority for his government is 
to dramatically expand Canada’s pipeline capacity to carry 
oilsand products from landlocked Alberta to ports on 
the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf of Mexico. His government 
is well-known for resisting efforts to reduce carbon 
emissions, weakening environmental legislation, reducing 
budgets for environmental research, and stifling public-
sector scientists.58
As the theory of petrostates would predict, a defining 
characteristic of the Harper government is its widespread 
efforts to mold – many would say weaken – the 
institutions that sustain Canada as a modern democracy. 
The list of institutions which he has confronted (with 
varying successes) is long, including these: the Parliament, 
by substantially altering its procedures for managing 
legislation; Elections Canada; public funding for political 
parties; Statistics Canada; the Parliamentary Budget 
Office; the Senate; and the Supreme Court. 
In the tradition of mineral state governments throughout 
history, Canada’s current government is striving to re-
shape the country’s institutions to give priority to mineral 
production, particularly petroleum, with little apparent 
concern for the health of democracy or the impending 
threat of global warming.
The Harper government is closely allied with the 
government of Australia under Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott. At a meeting in June, 2014, Harper praised Abbott 
for eliminating Australia’s carbon tax, and Abbott called 
Harper “a beacon” and an “exemplar of a contemporary, 
centre-right prime minister.”59 The governments of both 
men are resisting efforts domestically and internationally 
to reduce carbon emissions.
D. Alberta: A New Kind of Petrostate
In the classic petrostate, the undemocratic state channels 
its mineral wealth toward favoured power holders and 
elites, ignoring broader needs of social and economic 
development and environmental protection. These 
states typically become politically oppressive, plagued by 
inequality, violence, imbalanced economies, and low levels 
of social development. 
Alberta, like Norway and Australia, found an equilibrium 
in the relationship between the state as mineral owner 
and the interests that develop those minerals. It was an 
equilibrium that sustained a reasonable level of democracy 
and high levels of social and economic development.
57  http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/
gblec04-eng.htm
58  See for example Lewis, Naomi K. “The Assault on Science.”  
Alberta Views Magazine, Sept. 2013, pp. 35-39
59  Payton, Laura, “Tony Abbott, Stephen Harper take hard line against 
carbon tax,” June 9, 2014, CBC News.
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Global warming is stirring active threats to this 
equilibrium. Global warming requires political and state 
institutions to confront the interests of the fossil fuel 
industry to demand a reduction in emissions. This means 
curtailing the growth of the industry, and then reducing 
its size dramatically.
This poses a triple jeopardy for any government where 
an economy depends heavily on fossil fuel production, 
including governments of advanced democracies such  
as Alberta.
First, the government must overcome its own 
dependence on royalties, which will force tough 
political decisions about raising taxes, cutting 
services, and going into debt. 
Second, the government must simultaneously 
challenge a dominant economic, political, and 
social power in its economy, the fossil fuel industry. 
Third, the government must face both of these 
challenges in a situation where political and 
state institutions (such as parties, civil services, 
regulators, courts, media) have molded to function 
in support of a mineral economy.
Governments are unlikely to take on this challenge and 
survive. A democracy in this situation is in danger of 
becoming a higher-functioning version of the classic 
petrostate, with less oppression and higher social 
outcomes but the same basic function: expanding fossil 
fuel production, regardless of the long-term consequences 
for global warming or democracy. In this new kind of 
petrostate, when democracy is caught between the 
need to respond to global warming and the demands of 
the fossil fuel industry, global warming is ignored and 
democracy is sacrificed. Alberta is becoming such a place.
V. Warning Signs for Australia 
Karl’s theory of petrostates, when combined with the 
perspective of Mitchell’s work on carbon democracy, 
provides analytical focus and coherence to a situation 
that is puzzling, complicated, dispersed, and dangerous. 
It helps reveal how the fossil fuel industry is asserting its 
interests in a world struggling to respond effectively to 
global warming. In particular, it draws close attention to 
the crucial place of institutions in nurturing and sustaining 
democracy, and how, if those institutions are weakened, 
democracy can be jeopardized.
The warning here for Australians is clear. They are among 
the most prosperous people in the world. They depend 
for this prosperity more than the citizens of any other 
democracy upon mining, an important portion of which 
is for coal and natural gas. Sooner or later, governments 
in mining economies tend to place the interests of mineral 
production above priorities such as social development, 
economic diversity, and environmental protection. In 
Australia, the relationship between mineral production 
and other priorities is largely mediated by democratic 
institutions such as parliaments, political parties, 
regulators, civil services, courts, universities, and so on. 
These institutions have generally been up to that task,  
to the benefit of most Australians. 
In recent years two factors have emerged that put much 
greater pressure on these institutions. The first is the rapid 
concentration of Australia’s economy on mining, including 
coal and natural gas extraction. From 2006-07 to 2010-11, 
mining’s share of the value of total exports leapt from 
37% to 55%, while manufacturing’s share plummeted 
from 51% to 34%.60 Inevitably, this has implications for 
politics and democracy.
The second factor is global warming, the response to 
which requires major cuts to fossil fuel production. 
Australia is among the world’s largest exporters of coal 
and liquid natural gas. It is flourishing by selling products 
that science clearly says are endangering the planet.
So in Australia, as in Alberta and Canada, immense 
fossil fuel production comes into collision with global 
warming, and the institutions of democracy are caught 
in the middle. The risk is that fossil fuel interests are 
overpowering these institutions in order to sustain fossil 
fuel production, regardless of global warming. 
Is Australia at risk of succumbing to the fate of mining 
economies throughout history? Is it becoming a variant 
of mining states and petrostates, in which the democratic 
purposes of its institutions become supplanted by the 
requirement to support mineral production?
60  Australian Bureau of Statistics. (24/05/2012) “Mining Industry 
Economic Contribution,” Year Book Australia 2012, Table 18.4 
“Value of Exports,” p. 3. 
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The answers will be found, at least in part, by closely 
watching its democratic institutions. Are political parties 
being captured by fossil fuel interests? Are regulatory 
agencies losing their independence? Is the civil service 
increasingly compelled by the logic of fossil fuel 
production? What about universities, scientific institutions, 
or the appointment processes for judges? The questions 
should go far beyond the scope of this paper to include 
labour groups, the media, civil society organizations,  
and more.
The impression I have as an outsider (though no one is 
really an outsider to global warming) is that Australians 
have much to be concerned with, and would be unwise 
to assume that their democratic institutions are immune. 
Many of these changes occur quietly, below public notice. 
VI. In Conclusion
To close, I will return to the two questions that started this 
paper. First, what happens to democracy when the fossil 
fuel industry collides with global warming? The answer 
seems clear enough: the fossil fuel industry will defend  
its interests not just by engaging in democratic debate  
on the issues, but by working to get control of the 
democratic institutions that have the authority to require 
greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced. When it comes 
to democratic institutions the ambition of fossil fuel 
interests is comprehensive: it shapes political parties 
and through them legislatures and parliaments; it gains 
leadership of regulators; it compromises the independence 
of the civil service; it carries weight at universities; it may 
even reach into the courts. And the list could go  
far beyond these examples. 
These institutions are the bulwarks of democracy, and 
as their integrity is yielded to the fossil fuel industry, 
democracy suffers. The referee, as it were, takes the side 
of one of the players, corrupting the entire competition. 
Which leads to an answer for the second question,  
Can democracy as we know it survive global warming? 
Yes it can, but its survival is by no means certain, as 
history, theory, and practice all reveal. 
The struggle to respond effectively to global warming 
is also the struggle to preserve democracy. Neither 
democracy nor a healthy environment will prevail without 
a tough, smart, and prolonged effort. In both Canada and 
Australia that effort will need to be driven not by elites, 
but by the mass of citizens who demand a better future 
than the bleak and smouldering one that science currently 
says is on offer.
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